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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Respondent's brief raises some points not covered I 
in Appellant's brief, as well as a Cross-Complaint. 
One of the points raised by Respondent concerns 
matters allegedly raised for the first time on appeal and 
which were not raised in the pleadings or argued to the 
I 
trial Court. This requires a response and some considerabJI 
amount of argument to explain, which Appellant has include. 
in this Reply Brief. 
Other points covered in this Reply Brief respond 
to points raised in Respondent's brief which are inaccuratt 
or which are misleading unless explained in greater detail 
than is set forth in Appellant's brief. 
By way of additional comment, Appellant wishes tol 
respond to Respondent's assertion on Page 9 of its brief 
that "apparently there is no challenge to other Conclusion 
of Law, except number 2." This is factually not true, and 
Appellant wishes to be understood as being opposed to a 
nwnber of the Conclusions of Law as well as various Findin~: 
of Fact since Appellant believes many of them to be imprope: 
or inaccurate. Appellant did not attempt to catalogue all 
its objections since many, al though believed to be erroneou' 
are not critical to Appellant's theory of this case. 
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POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE 
MEANING AND EFFECT OF CONCLUSION OF 
LAW NUMBER TWO IS ERRONEOUS. 
Respondent's argument in Point I concerning the 
distinction between what Appellant asserts is a finding 
that Respondent was excused from having to comply with the 
"split stockpile" provision by the Court and what Respondent 
asserts is a finding that "Respondent was led to believe 
that what it did was in compliance with contract require-
ments" is a legal fiction. Respondent's argument merely 
proves Appellant's contention to the effect that Respondent 
intended to mislead Appellant into believing that it intended 
to comply with the split stockpile provision as set out in 
the contract while all along it intended to circumvent the 
requirement to construct separate sized piles of aggregate. 
(See Appellant's Argument on this point in Section I of its 
brief.) 
If in fact Respondent at the time it submitted its 
alternate proposal did not intend to colocate the piles of 
separate sized aggregate at the hot mix plant, why didn't it 
say so in its proposal? Again, if this was its intent at 
that time, why didn't it advise the engineer that what it 
planned to do did not in fact "meet the intent" of the speci-
fication when it received the reply from the State's engineer? 
-2-
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(Exh. P-3). Appellant does not agree that Respondent 
or the trial judge were correct in Conclusion of Law No. 1 
that "there was no requirement in the contract as to where' 
the three stockpiles were to be located." A fair reading 
of the specification reveals that it is talking about how 
aggregate piles are to be stored and the composition of tht 
piles. It also says "the minus 4 aggregate shall be f~~ 
a uniform rate." (Exh. D-4, Sheets 56 and 57) It is an 
inescapable conclusion that if you feed the "minus 4 aggre· 
gate at a uniform rate'' you have to mix in aggregate larger 
than number 4, or you will not meet specification reguiremq 
Thus, the location of the piles at the hot plant site is Sf~ 
fied at least by implication, since one pile alone would nc 
suffice. 
Nhether the Court concluded that Respondent was "e 
cused" from complying with the specification on aggregate ! 
I 
storage, or merely "led to believe" that what it did was in, 
I 
compliance with the requirement. is really immaterial. The/ 
net effect is the same and in either instance the Court wasl 
wrong. i 
I 
Without the testimony of Appellant's engineer 1~ho I 
was stricken a few days prior to trial by a stroke and in 'I 
coma during the first phase of trial (R. 677)1 and deceased I 
I 
during the second phase, the Appellant was unable to ascertt 
why Respondent was permitted to start production of asphalt! 
I 
-3-
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without the storage of aggregate in separate sized piles 
at the plant site. The record shows that Respondent had 
continued to assure Appellant that the piles would be lo-
cated at the hot plant as late as Sept. 16, 1975, which was 
two days before production began. (R. 655) 1 In fact, on this 
date Appellant's engineer Burgess told Wood he had to have 
"three" piles to be in specification. (R. 673} On September 
23, 1975, Appellant's engineer Burgess by letter directed 
that "two or more piles be located at the plant." (Exh. P-5) 
If Appellant's engineer permitted Respondent to proceed with-
out the requisite piles at the hot plant, it was not author-
ized by any contract modification in writing. If it was done 
by verbal permission of Appellant's engineer, then Respondent 
should have known that Appellant's engineer Burgess did not 
have the authority to change the specification as he had al-
ready stated in writing. (Exh. D-9) The record also shows 
that Appellant's chief materials engineer had specifically 
told Mr. Wood of Respondent that the use of one stockpile 
was not acceptable in a meeting on August 20, 1975. (R. 286-
289} In view of the letter from Burgess dated September 23, 
1975 (Exh. P-5) it appears that the engineer had not in fact 
authorized Respondent to proceed without the multiple piles 
at the hot plant site. The record shows that the Appellant's 
understanding was that the piles of different sized aggregate 
referred to in Respondent's proposal of May 28, 1975 would be 
located at the plant site. (R. 678) 1 
-4-
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Respondent in Point I of its brief refers to 
Conclusions of Law numbered 6,7, and 8 which deal with 
the bituminous surface course gravel and which demonstrate 
substantial compliance with the acceptance criteria for 
that product. Respondent asserts that because it met the 
acceptance criteria for payment, its failure to follow the 
method specification (if that in fact was the case) is 
"harmless error." Appellant submits that this is false, 
They are two entirely different matters. Respondent is 
suggesting here that since he can meet the payment speci-
fication he should not be required to follow the "method ! 
specification." This ignores the fact that the "method 
specification" is an integral part of the contract. A~ 
pellant' s witnesses Stephensen and Peterson testified con-
cerning the importance of the "method" at great length. 
(R. 289-290 and R. 474-486) 1 The record further demon-
strates the fallacy of the Court's Conclusions 6,7 and 8. 
Appellant submits that had the contractor followed the 
"method" it might have been in "full" compliance rather 
than "substantial." In any event, Respondent's ability to 
meet the payment specification doesn't justify failure to 
follow the "method" specification. It should be observed 
here that the trial Court avoids this pitfall by its Findin1 
of Fact No. 8 to the effect that Mr. wood of Respondent was 
informed by Mr. Anderson of Appellant that Sheet No. 56 
-5-
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(aggregate storage) of the special provisions (Exh. D-4) 
would not apply. Its further Conclusion of Law No. 2 
based on this Finding of Fact regarding the Respondent 
"being led to believe an adjustment in the specification 
would be made,'' thus renders the testimony of several of 
Appellant's witnesses moot on the point of the necessity 
of following the method specification. 
Appellant asserts that the evidence of its wit-
nesses shows the absolute necessity of the method being 
followed. Again, Respondent's ability to stay within "sub-
stantial compliance" under the pay specification is not the 
issue, and the Court's findings in this area, while not spe-
cifically contested, are simply unnecessary. A comparison 
of these findings with Exhibit No. D-12 reveals their in-
accuracy in any event. 
In any event, let it be clearly understood that 
Appellant here objects to Conclusion of Law No. 2 if it in 
fact means anything different than that Respondent is excused 
from compliance with the "split stockpile" requirement. Ap-
pellant further takes issue with Conclusion of Law No. 4 to 
the effect that there was no requirement in the contract as 
to where the three stockpiles were to be located for the reason 
set forth above, i.e., that the implication is that the piles 
(at least two) would be colocated at the plant site to allow 
material to be fed at a "uniform rate." Respondent further 
-6-
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disagrees that "plaintiff (Respondent) was reasonably 1~ 
to believe that it was in compliance with the requirement 
of said construction contract" as suggested by Conclus~ 
No. 6. Appellant submits that the evidence is quite the 
contrary and shows, if anything, that Respondent was prot 
ing that it would comply while all along it had no intent: 
of complying. 
Appellant further disagrees that Appellant breac' 
the contract and specifically disagrees with the assertio: 
Respondent on page 11 of its brief that a "reversal of p~ 
graph 2 of the findings would not require a reversal of p: 
graphs 7, 8 and 9." What Appellant has urged and argued: 
its brief is that if Respondent in fact has failed to com;: 
with its alternate proposal contained in its letter of Mail 
1975 (Exh. D-1), then it is guilty of the "first breac~t 
whether or not Appellant in fact breached the contract as 
concluded in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the Conclusions oft 
is immaterial. 
25, 1975 
Appellant submits that if its letter of September 
(Exh. P-6) is looked at in a "vacuum" it is easri 
conclude that it may constitute a breach. On the other ht 
when it is placed in context with previous discussions ani 
correspondence [Aug. 20, 1975 meeting (R. 286-289)1, Sept .. 
1975 conversation (R. 655i1 and Exh. P-5) it is apparent t~ 
it was an attempt to insure compliance by Respondent with 
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what it had previously agreed to do. Coupled with the 
fact that payment was ultimately made for the material 
referred to in said Exhibit,(R. 305, 316) 2 it is evident 
that the Court is in error in concluding that Appellant's 
letter of Sept. 25, 1975 was in fact a breach of contract. 
(Finding of Fact No. 21) 
Therefore, if it is concluded that Conclusion of 
Law No. 2 is incorrect, then it means that Respondent was 
not "lead to believe that the contract would be modified 
or that what it in fact did was in compliance with the con-
tract." This would leave Respondent subject to contract 
requirements, and Appellant submits that the evidence 
demonstrates that what Respondent did was not in compliance 
with its own written proposal since it was, at the least, 
interpreted differently by the parties with the responsi-
bility for the ambiguity placed on the Respondent. This 
leaves Respondent in the position of committing the first 
breach even if Appellant can be considered to have breached 
the contract by its subsequent letter of September 25, 1975. 
(Exh. P-6) 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS CONCERNING RESPONDENT'S 
''FIRST BREACH" AND "ELECTION OF REMEDIES'' WERE 
RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND ARE NOT WAIVED 
UNDER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
-8-
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On page 13 of Respondent's brief it is asserted 
that the point concerning the "election of remedies" ana 
"election to continue performance" of the contract by Re-
spondent were not raised before the trial Court but raise 
for the first time on appeal. This assertion is not true, 
the record of the trial discloses that this point was raL 
on page 700 of the record of the first phase of the trial, 
At the commencement of trial Appellant sought leave to am' 
its answer to raise the defense of performance by Pritchet 
Construction as a waiver of the breach. The exchange bet; 
Court and counsel cited above raises this defense as ~t 
dustrial. Initially, it was Appellant's belief that perft 
mance by Industrial subsequent to Sept. 26, l975 did notq 
any of its rights. Appellant subsequently determined that 
this performance by Industrial was after receipt of Appe!LI 
letter clearly advising Respondent that any performance~ 
be "pursuant to the contract.'' lExh. P-10) Appellant ada. 
tionally believes and therefore submits that any perforrnar., 
for whatever reason is either a waiver of the right to cla: 
a breach or an election of remedy to proceed with perfornr 
The Respondent also asserts on page 12 of its brii, 
that the point concerning "first breach'' of the contracto:I 
I 
Respondent was not raised before the trial Court. This is 
also not accurate. 
The first part was 
The trial of this matter was bifurcatel 
to determine whether the Appellant had 1 
I 
-9-
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breached the contract. This portion was tried on March 25, 
26, 27, and on April 1, 1976. At the conclusion of this 
phase of the trial each of the parties submitted extensive 
Memorandums of Points and Authorities. These were submitted 
on April 1, 1976. In its Memorandum the Appellant raised 
the issue of first breach of the contract on pages 5 and 22.* 
The point concerning waiver of the breach by Respondent is 
argued on pages 15 and 16 of said memorandum under Section IV. 
Appellant's Motion to Add the Defense Concerning 
Election and Waiver as to Performance by Pritchett Construction 
co. was submitted March 19, 1976. The Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities is dated April 1, 1976. There were 4 days of trial 
in the interim with the major focus concentrated on the issue 
of breach of contract. By the time the Memorandums were sub-
mitted on April 1, 1976, the issues were much more sharply de-
fined than in prior pleadings to the Court. 
There was no formal request to amend the pleadings 
to conform to the evidence and particularly as regards the 
legal issues we are concerned with here. It is clear, how-
ever, that there was no objection by Respondent to these issues 
being raised and argued either by a written objection subsequent 
to April 1, 1976 or a statement for the record when the trial 
resumed on June 30, 1976. During the interim, and specifically 
on the 20th day of April, 1976, counsel for the parties met with 
* Pages Q BO and Q 97 in the Record of Pleadings. 
-10-
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the trial Judge in Fillmore when the Court ruled that A~ 
pellant breached the contract. The Court during that Pro. 
ceeding made the following statement in announcing its 
ruling: 
• • • And the Court further finding that 
any additional work done by the Plaintiff and/ 
or his Joint Venturer, to-wit: Pritchett Con-
struction Company, was performed for the safety 
of the public and as an essential, necessary~ 
and mitigating work for the safety of the general 
public, and did not, in fact or in lieu, waive~ 
the breach of the contract, or any rights plaTn-
tiff had thereunder, or any duty or obligations I 
that the plaintiff had . • . . (Emphasis s upplied,i 
(R.P.3 of April 20, 1976 Proceedings at Millard 
County Courthouse, Fillmore.) 
I 
Note in the emphasized language the Court is referring to 
1 
work done by Industrial Construction Co. I 
In the case of General Insurance Co. of America v.1 
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, this Court said the I 
following: 
There must, of course, be 
or implied consent of the parties for 
issues not raised in the pleadings. 
may be found where one party raises 
to the other party's case, or where 
duced without objection. (Citation) 
either expres: 
the trial of 
Implied cons~ 
an issue mater 
evidence is in' 
Significantly, the first part of Rule lS(b) i 
not permissive in terms, for it provides that issu'• 
tried by express or implied consent shall be treat' 
as if raised in the pleadings. (Citation to 3 Moon 
Federal Practice, 2d Ed. p. 991) Even failure~ 
amend does not affect the results of the trial of 
these issues. 
More recently this Court in the case of L.A. Young Sons~ 
struction Company v. County of Tooele, et al., decided Febr 
-11-
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14, 1978, cited the holding in the General Insurance co. case 
and sustained that case. Factually, in the Young case, there 
was an objection raised to the attempt to raise different is-
sues during the trial. In the instant case there was no ob-
jection to the issues concerning waiver of the breach by per-
formance subsequent to that event by Respondent's election of 
remedies, and the point concerning first breach was likewise 
not objected to. The precedent of the General Insurance Co. 
case should therefore be controlling in this matter, and Ap-
pellant should not be foreclosed from raising this matter on 
appeal. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ANTICIPATED PROFITS IS 
IN ERROR AND RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF IS INCORRECT. 
Respondent in Point IV of its brief alleges that the 
trial Court did not err in its award of anticipated profits. 
Appellant does not disagree with the legal authorities cited 
by Respondent but does take issue with the conclusions Respon-
dent arrives at to the effect that they sustain the damages 
awarded by the trial Court for anticipated profits. 
The main area of. disagreement is with the assertion 
on page 33 of Respondent's brief that four deductions totaling 
$166,876.38 which Appellant contends reduce available monies 
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remaining in the contract at the time of th c 
e ourt determir 
breach should not be deducted but should in fact be added 
the computation set forth in Appellant's brief. This wouJ'. 
demonstrate that sufficient monies are in fact available tc 
allow an award of anticipated profit as great as that awar: 
by the trial Court. A closer look at this will dernonstrat: 
that not only is Appellant correct but that the possibilitr 
of any money for anticipated profit is even more tenuous e. 
asserted by Appellant in its calculations set forth in Poir 
III of its brief on appeal. 
The four i terns which total the sum of $166, 876,J~ 
are as follows: 
Offset for finishing subgrade embankment $11,on 
Stipulated offset for finishing top soil, 
clean up, etc. 26,Jtj 
Adjustment for overpayment of roadway 
excavation 61,%~ 
Adjustment for top soil quantity included 
in roadway excavation 68,01~ 
The first item is the amount Respondent conceded it would c1 
to finish the subgrade embankment. Payment for this work i* 
included item in the contract pay item of roadway excavatio 
Appellant's evidence on this point was that it would costi 
much as $132,625.62 (R. 453)2 to do this work, but the trial~ 
accepted Respondent 1 s self-serving "opinion estimate" (whici 
incidentally was virtually unsupported by any calculations: 
was strictly the opinion of Mr. Wood) instead of considerir 
-13-
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pellant's mass of evidence based on actual experience with 
this contractor on a job contemporaneous with and which was 
similar in scope, terrain, men and equipment to the subject 
project. (R. 174-2232 and Exh. D-61 and D-62) To the extent 
that Respondent is incorrect in his estimate, the $90,301.35 
which Appellant's calculation assertsismaximurn available 
revenue for profit would be reduced accordingly. In any 
event, the figure of $11,055.00 represents the minimum actual 
cost to do the work and would not increase available revenues 
which would generate a profit. 
The stipulated offset for finishing topsoil, clean 
up, etc. in the amount of $26,301.48 is again an offset for 
work unfinished on the date of the Court determined breach 
and represents the cost of doing work which is included in 
payment already received by Respondent. 
As to these two items it could be argued that in 
the ordinary course Respondent would have recovered these 
amounts and should not be penalized. The answer to that is 
that the evidence at trial in effect demonstrates that Re-
spondent has already recovered his anticipated profit in 
that he has recovered the full contract unit price without 
fully completing the work. Therefore, if Respondent is al-
lowed to recover anticipated profit in addition to these 
amounts it results in a double recovery. For that reason 
the reduction is proper. 
-14-
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The last two items of "roadway excavation" and 
adjustment for topsoil are both the result of adjustmenb 
to previously estimated payments of the roadway excavation 
pay item based on actual measurements. As to the topsoil, 
payment is made under the pay item for "topsoil, state fur-
nished" at $1.00 per cubic yard as opposed to $0.92 for~ 
pay i tern of "roadway excavation. " The record shows that 
separate measurements of topsoil amounts were kept and com-
puted into yardage. (R. 310) 2 In paragraph 28 of the Fine~ 
of Fact the Court has properly allowed this reduction. In;j 
graph 26 of the Findings of Fact the Court has provided for! 
ment of the topsoil. As to the roadway excavation deductio: 
measurements of the partially completed work revealed an ov0 
payment in the dollar amount of $68, 018. 82. (Exh. D-67) Int 
di tion, the testimony of James Cox which was unrefuted in tl 
I 
record revealed that the remaining amount of roadway excavat 
was estimated to be 303, 000 cubic yards (R. 247) instead of! 
I 432, 967, which would be the mathematical difference between1 
the amount paid for and the total planned quantity. (Exh, D-1 
Any underrun in gu~nti ty either. f~om actual measurement or .I 
based upon the estimate of remaining work means a corresponc! 
ing reduction in available dollars remaining in the contract 
Respondent's counsel in his agreement under Point IV of Re· 
spondent' s brief is assuming that a deduction for an overpa1 
to the contractor means the money is available to the contra· 
-15-
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As can be seen, this is not true. If the planned quantity 
of a pay item underruns for whatever reason, the estimated 
contract amount is reduced accordingly. In the case of 
roadway excavation remaining to be done at the time of the 
court determined breach, the question is moot anyway. The 
testimony of Respondent's witness Hitchcock established that 
there is no profit in the remaining roadway excavation be-
cause the cost of performing the work equals the return. 
(R. 109) 2 Appellant submits that contrary to Respondent's 
assertion, the deductions are proper in Appellant's calcu-
lations. 
On page 34 of Respondent's brief it is argued that 
the Appellant's witness Rowley justified an award of 30% profit. 
This is an outright distortion of the testimony of the witness 
Rowley. The evidence shows that 30% is added on to the total 
labor amount, but not to equipment charges. (Exh. D-2, Sec. 
109.04) This is quite different from the assertion of a 30% 
profit as claimed by the witness Hitchcock. In fact the wit-
ness Rowley testified that the 30% added on to the labor amount 
was for " ••• fixed costs, plus profit, fixed costs (sic), 
supervision and profit." [R. 210) 2 
It is clear that Respondent has not successfully 
refuted Appellant's claim that the money remaining in the con-
tract at the time of the Court determined breach would not 
justify an award of anticipated profit in excess of $90,301.35, 
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and then only if one assumes that Respondent's optimistic 
cost projections are correct. 
POINT IV 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS CON-
CERNING GENERAL DAMAGES. 
Appellant submits that the arguments advanced by 
Respondent do not alter the fact that there is no substanti: 
evidence before the Court relating to "general damages." I: 
facts asserted by Respondent on page 36 are at the best ont. 
half true. For instance, fact number 1 there set forth all!~ 
that "Plaintiff had the contracting capacity to bid and~~ 
this contract, amounting to almost $7,000,000 ..•• " The 
truth is Respondent had to enter into a joint-venture agre~j 
I 
with Pritchett Construction Co. in order to bid the project,; 
(R. 419-420) 1 
Respondent has also inserted a "bootstrap argumen: 
on page 37 of its brief as follows: 
It is most probable, in view of the 
amounts involved, that the trial Court 
would have awarded damages in a greater 
amount, but limited the recovery to $100,000 
because that was all that was prayed for in 
plaintiff's complaint. 
The "amounts involved" are really immaterial unless they re 
ably relate to a "damage" that is supported by "substantial 
dence." 
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Appellant by way of argument to counter Respon-
dent's argument as set forth would simply observe that he 
has never known an attorney to draft a complaint seeking 
general damages which did not pray for more than he believed 
the damages to be. 
The trial Court was in error to award the full 
claimed amount without substantial evidence in the record. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO ARGUHENTS BY 
RESPOHDENT THAT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
COURT'S ALLOWANCE OF VARIOUS OTHER 
DAMAGE ITEMS. 
A. COSTS OF WATER 
On pages 38 and 39 of its brief Respondent argues 
that payment for water is not included in the pay item for 
"mobilization" and that Respondent's allocation of water costs 
to other contract items that required water is proper. In 
support of this argument Respondent cites Section 207 (Exh. 
D-2, pp. 82-83) of the Standard Specifications which is en-
titled "watering" and argues that this "shows that payment for 
water is not normally included under the heading of 'rnobiliza-
tion.' " (Emphasis supplied.} 
In the subject contract there was no separate pay 
item for "watering." Unless Appellant is grossly mistaken it 
seems that this makes Section 601.01 directly applicable. Re-
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spondent's arguments are therefore moot, and regardless of 
the testimony in support of Respondent's claim it cannot 
alter the contract provision. To rule otherwise invites 
the possibility of a double recovery for this amount. 
B. BITUMINOUS PAVING DONE AFTER BREACH AND OFFSET CLAIMED 
BY APPELLANT BUT NOT ALLOWED BY THE COURT. 
These two items and the arguments advanced by 
Respondent illustrate the hypocrisy and inconsistency of 
the Court 1 s ruling regarding damages better than anything 
else in the judgment. 
The Court, even though it found the contract to 
have been breached on September 25, 1975 by Appellant, neve:! 
I 
theless allowed Respondent to recover for paving work done:1, 
October of 1975 under a "force account" or cost-plus formuLi 
I 
which is a contract method used when an agreement for extral 
work cannot otherwise be arrived at. This was permitted by 
l 
the Court even though the Appellant had notified Respondent 
in writing (Exh. P-10) that work performed would be consider 
part of the contract. 
Contrast the 
the Court in rejecting 
foregoing with the approach taken by I 
Appellant's evidence regarding the cc 
of finishing portions of the subgrade which were uncompletec 
as of September 25, 1975. Appellant's evidence was basedoi 
a force account approach using actual figures construct~fi 
labor and equipment reports on a job similar in scope, terra 
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equipment, manpower and supervision contemporaneous with the 
subject project involving Respondent contractor. This "force 
account" a~proach revealed that the actual cost to Respondent 
of this "finish" work was $0.27 per square yard. Appellant's 
evidence defined in detail the yardage requiring finishing 
and was illustrated by over thirty photographs. The Court, 
however, rejected this approach. The dollar amount involved 
totaled $132,625.62. (R. 453) 2 
Respondent in its brief quotes Mr. Rowley as having 
testified that this was what it would "cost the State if the 
2 
work was done on force account." (R. 193) Appellant's response 
is that it only wants the Court to be consistent. If it is go-
ing to use a force account approach against Appellant, then it 
should also apply that formula against Respondent in a similar 
situation. In other words, to use an old adage, "what's good 
for the goose is good for the gander." 
For the Court's information, the amount the Court 
allowed Respondent to recover for paving work done in October 
1975 is $49,554.18. This is in addition to the contract price 
already paid based on the unit price. The amount Appellant seeks 
to offset for the cost of finishing subgrade is $132,625.62. The 
Court allowed $11,055.00. The offset is to reduce the amount 
already paid for roadway excavation totaling over one million 
dollars to allow for finishing work which is an included element 
in the unit price for roadway excavation. 
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If the Court's ruling is allowed to stand as to 
these two items, it can be readily seen that R d espon ent g: 
the "best of both worlds." Some relief is obviously due! 
pellant. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD 
ADDITIONAL MONEY TO RESPONDENT FOR EXPENSE 
OF RENTED EQUIPMENT. 
In Point VII of its brief, the Respondent asserts 
that the Court was in error in that it failed to award the 
Respondent damages totaling $446, 531. 42 for equipment rent 
from others. The Court awarded the st.UU of $191,370.00. 
Appellant in Point V of its brief has argued that, 
I 
the Court is in error in its ruling and that the amount a1t 
is excessive. l'Vhile conceding that in a bona fide breach!; 
contract it is proper to award damages for equipment renta!i 
the Appellant nevertheless asserts that those damages te~ 
I 
if the rental agreements can be cancelled without penalty1j 
can be converted to a purchase contract and when it appear!I 
that substantial equity benefits have accrued. 
Appellant asserts that the rights of the parties: 
the instant case were fixed as of October 22, 1975 when thi 
Respondent stated it considered the contract terminated. ! 
spondent in its brief argued that if Appellant had "recogni 
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its own breach of contract" that the "contention of Ap-
pellant would have merit." Obviously, the parties on 
September 25, 1975, October 22, 1975 and at the present 
time do not agree that a breach of the contract did or 
did not occur. Appellant still does not believe that it 
occurred, and Respondent obviously asserts that it did. 
The point is that the Respondent elected to stand on the 
alleged breach as of October 22, 1975, and that date should 
fix the liability of the parties and govern the consequences. 
It can readily be seen that if the agreements could have been 
terminated without penalty as of that date, that the Court's 
award is at least three times what would have been appropri-
ate. To say that because Appellant refuses to admit it 
breached the contract justifies Respondent in retaining the 
equipment and incurring additional rental is ridiculous. 
Having elected to stand on the breach, Respondent incurs a 
duty to mitigate its damages. 
The Court's award of $191,370.00 should be reduced 
if anything, but certainly should not be increased as urged 
by Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant having responded to the points raised in 
Respondent's brief, including some new matters, submits that 
the relief requested in Appellant's brief is appropriate and 
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requests that the Court consider the relief requested on 
appeal as set forth in said brief. 
Respectfully submitted this i'f!f(_ day of May, 1911 
sistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoi~ 
Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Jom 
G. Marshall of Tuft and Marshall, Attorneys for Respondent, 
603 East 4500 South, Suite B, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107, 
this /9/Z day of May, 1978. 
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